Chapter 2

Eleven Theses on the *Humanization* of Development:

'Transformative Philosophy' in World of the Third

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ABSTRACT: This paper makes space for eleven possible moves to humanize development. The first is to turn to capabilities-functionings, quality of life and questions of well-being. The second is a critique of the reduction of a part of humanity to the epithet *underdeveloped* and the consequent dehumanization. The third is a disaggregation of the map of the world into those that are 'hooked to the circuits of global capital' and those that are not and are *outside* (designated *world of the third*). The fourth is a turn to post-capitalist and post-Orientalist *subject positions* that constitute the world of the third. The fifth is premised on a critique of vanguardist (development) practice and the need to learn to learn from below. The sixth is premised on the problems of (development) studies. Development Studies can perhaps be humanized only if it is singed in transformative social praxis; i.e. if poverty is alleviated; not just studied. The seventh would mean a displacement of 'field work' with *immersion in subaltern life-worlds and worldviews*, of research with *action research*, of theories of social suffering with *practices of social healing*. Does this require an eighth: i.e. a Borromean Knot of *knowing-being-doing*? Does this require a ninth: i.e. a rewriting of development as (rural) *reconstruction*? Does this require a tenth: i.e. a turn to *transformative philosophy* – where philosophy is not just a way of knowing but a *dharma* – a *way of life* and *ethical living?* The eleventh is premised on the question: do we need to *cure ourselves of the paradigmatic Cure*: development?

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> A camel may not have the speed of a horse, but it is a very useful and harmonious animal – well coordinated to travel long distances without food and water.
>
> Amartya Sen[1]

What will make development *human*; or *humane*? How does one *humanize* development? What is human about 'human development'? Do we need to move beyond the 'human development index' – beyond mere measure (this is not to deny the importance of certain measures) – to render human development, *human(e)*? This particular paper makes space for eleven possible moves to humanize development. The first is of course to turn to capabilities-functionings, quality of life and questions of well-being (in addition to 'growth' and infrastructure expansion; even building on a critique of growth [Gerber and Raina, 2018]). The second is a critique of the reduction of a part of humanity to the epithet *underdeveloped* and the consequent dehumanization; is the one deemed underdeveloped, *differently developed*; developed in non-capitalocentric, non-Orientalist paradigms? Is it a 'camel' and not an '*underdeveloped* horse'; its strength is in *sustainability* and not in spikes of productivity? The third is a disaggregation of the map of the world into those that are 'hooked to the circuits of global capital' and those that are not and are *outside* (designated *world of the third*). The brunt of the cruelty of (capitalist) development projects is borne by the world of the third subjects. This paper is a critique of that inhumanity and an attention to the pain inflicted upon the world of the third. The fourth is a turn to those *subject positions* that constitute the world of the third. Such post-capitalist and at times, post-Orientalist subject positions – if groomed to a futurity – further humanize development. The

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[1] Sen, A. (1999). "The Possibility of Social Choice". *The American Economic Review*, *89*(3), 349–378. http://www.jstor.org/stable/117024

fifth is premised on a reflection on the problems of vanguardist (development) practice and the need to 'learn to learn from below', learn from the indigenous-Dalit-woman continuum. The sixth is premised on the problems of (development) studies and the need to re-establish the long lost real relationship with the 'subaltern'. Not to study them; not to churn out papers on their miseries; but to relate to them and their miseries; to alleviate some of the *social suffering*, if possible. The sixth would be premised on what Arendt designates as the "old and short-lived Socratic urge of being in the polis". Development Studies can perhaps be humanized only if it is singed in development practice, in transformative social praxis; i.e. if poverty is alleviated; not just studied. The seventh would be in terms of what Marx designates in the first of the Eleven Thesis as "dirtying one's hands". It would also mean the displacement of 'field work' with *immersion in subaltern life-worlds and worldviews*, of research with *action research*, of theories of social suffering with *practices of social healing*; this humanizes to some extent the extractive and appropriative relationship the academia has hitherto had with the 'research participant' (Waitoa and Dombroski,). Does this require an eighth: i.e. a Borromean Knot of *knowing-being-doing*? Does this require a ninth: i.e. a rewriting of development as (rural) *reconstruction*; Tagore designates it as *palli samaj er punarnirmaan* (Dhar and Chakrabarti, 2021)? Does this require a tenth: i.e. a turn to *transformative philosophy* – a philosophy of not just being intelligent but about *being good* as well – where philosophy is not just a way of knowing but a *dharma* – a *way of life* and *ethical living?* The eleventh opens space for a final reflection: reflection on 'development'; development in itself. It is premised on the question: do we need to *cure ourselves of the paradigmatic Cure*: development?

I.   From Growth to *Human* Development:

The limitation of much of Marxist work has been the inability to relate and connect the question of surplus with the question of *need*. Yet, there can be no denying the fact that such a lacuna in Marxist theory could have been avoided had a little more attention been paid to Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* written between April and early May, 1875 and which was first published in the journal *Die Neue Zeit*, Vol. 1, No. 18 in the year 1890-91. Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme* is a critique of the draft programme of the United Workers' Party of Germany. In this document Marx addresses the question of the transition from capitalism to communism, of the two phases of communist

society, and of the production and fair distribution of social goods. It is in this text that Marx rethinks the issue of surplus distribution. Among other forms of distribution of surplus, Marx mentions, (i) the general costs of administration not belonging to production, (ii) that which is intended for the common satisfaction of needs, such as schools, health services, etc. (for Marx, from the outset, this part grows considerably in comparison with present day society, and it grows in proportion as the new society develops) and (iii) funds for those unable to work, etc., in short, for what is included under the so-called official poor relief today (Marx, 1977: 17).[2]

Amartya Sen, who is no less committed to *distribution*, has pointed to the putting aside within Marxism of Marx's emphasis on the relation of distribution with the question of need (Sen, 1997: 87-89; Chakrabarti, 2001). In this context, Sen retorts: "while exploitation has played an important part in Marxian economics, it would be a mistake to think that deserts (roughly the created wealth) took priority over needs in the Marxian analysis of distribution, or that Marx was not clear on the distinction. In fact, he made the distinction very sharply and accepted the ultimate superiority of the needs principle" (Sen, 1997: 87-88). Sen takes off from Marx's understanding of distribution and need and moves from social choice theory towards what he referred to as the *capability's approach* (Sen, 1989). We mark this moment as the first act of the humanization of development.

Sen (1999) shows how utilitarianism has hitherto shaped welfare economics. "Bentham had pioneered the use of utilitarian calculus to obtain judgments about the social interest by aggregating the personal interests of the different individuals in the form of their respective utilities. [However, by] the 1930s the utilitarian welfare economics came under severe fire" (Sen, 1999: 352); John Rawls (1971) had taken the critique forward by putting to question the utilitarian neglect of distributional issues and its concentration on utility sum-totals in a distribution blind way (Sen, 1999: 358). Rawls's "two principles of justice" characterize the need for equality in terms of, what he has called, "primary social goods". These are "things every rational man is presumed to want" including "rights, liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect". Rawls's fundamental principle is that of individual rights over primary goods that they are assumed to need: "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others". For Rawls, "*injustice ... is simply inequalities* that are not to the benefit of all" (Rawls, 1971: 62). According to him, if individuals are rational and risk averse, they will choose only two

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[2] This paper takes off from the Marxian roots of the capabilities approach. One can also take off from the Smithian roots, as Sen has done and Aristotelian roots, as Nussbaum does.

principles of justice among many available (1971: 60-65). The first principle is the 'liberty principle' that calls for the individual having the right to basic liberty; which includes political liberty, freedom of speech, thought and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom to hold private property, freedom from unrest and seizes, and freedom to live within a rule of law. The second is the 'difference principle', which applies to the distribution of wealth and income as also to the structure of social organization premised on a chain of command. Rawls himself privileges the first principle over the second; though for distributional concerns the 'difference principle' acquired importance and later became the subject of an intense debate. The main object of distribution is in terms of social primary goods that individuals are in need of. Primary goods are of two types: *natural primary goods*, which are affected by social institutions but not provided by them (vigor, health, intelligence, etc.) and *social primary goods* (income and wealth, power, rights, etc.), which are distributed by social institutions. Rawls' justice principle called for articulating principles that would provide people the best possible access to primary goods through social institutions. For Rawls, the starting point is the hypothetical situation of equal distribution of social primary goods to all the citizens. This provides a benchmark to Sen to measure the extent of equality/inequality; "equality of what" is Sen's question in *Inequality Reexamined* (1997).

Inequalities will be accommodated as long as it allows for superior distribution of primary goods to the worst off in society in a scenario where individuals are free to move from one position to another by virtue of equal opportunity. Thus, even if breeding inequality, the difference principle by virtue of facilitating the worse-off, by enabling them access to primary goods that they need is adjudged as fair. Later, Rawls's primary goods approach was further displaced (perhaps extended also) towards a resource based distributional theory by Dworkin and Roemer.

Sen (1999) shows how utilitarian welfare economics gave way from the 1940s onwards, to a so called new welfare economics which used only one basic criterion of social improvement, Pareto comparison. In modern welfare economics, Pareto optimality evaluates the economic terrain without any consideration of equity concerns. "If the lot of the poor cannot be made any better without cutting into the affluence of the rich, the situation would be Pareto optimal despite the disparity between the rich and the poor" (Sen, 1997: 7). Modern welfare economics is a non-starter so far as equity is concerned. In this context, Sen (1985a, 1993), based on an 'internalist evaluative inquiry', offers a rather different rendition of distribution, that also "sees persons from ... different perspectives", through the invocation of the conceptual space of *well-being* and *agency* (neither of

which can subsume the other), functionings and capabilities, and freedom as against the commodity approach (an approach circumscribed by a certain 'commodity fetishism' to use Marx's term; an approach that overemphasizes goods and neglects people), the utilitarian approach (an approach that overemphasizes people's mental states and neglects other aspects of their well-being) and the Basic Needs Approach (Sen, 1985: 169-221):

The capability approach clearly differs crucially from the more traditional approaches to individual and social evaluation, based on such variables as primary goods (as in Rawlsian evaluative system), resources (as in Dworkin's social analysis), or real analysis (as in the analyses focusing on the GNP, GDP...). These variables are all concerned with the instruments of achieving well-being and other objectives, and can be seen also as the means to freedom." (Sen, 1999: 42) … It is in asserting the need to examine the value of functionings and capabilities as opposed to confining attention to the means to these achievements and freedoms (such as resources or primary goods or incomes) that the capability approach has something to offer (Sen, 1999: 46).

Amartya Sen's (1985a, 1985b, 1993) capability approach argues that at any time, a person is endowed with a combination of 'doings or beings' that is designated as functioning. *Well-being* is conceptualized as the quality of the person's living. Living is constitutive of a space of interrelated functionings that people value in doing or as being. If living is constituted by functionings then capability captures the freedom enjoyed by a person to achieve well-being. More specifically, capability captures a person's freedom to enjoy one type of living over another represented by alternative combinations of functionings (of doings and beings). The actual freedom enjoyed by a person is then represented by the person's capability to make a choice among different ways of living, that is, different combinations of doings and beings or functionings. Of this possible menu of living, a person's achieved living is a chosen combination of functionings. Clearly, in Sen's framework, a person would enjoy greater freedom if she were capable of choosing a greater range of different ways of living that she values. Sen would thus define 'development *as* freedom' in the form of an expansion of the capability of citizens to choose from a greater number of available combinations of functionings. We achieve greater development with greater freedom and reduced development if freedom is curtailed in which case we encounter 'capability truncation' or at worse 'capability deprivation' qua poverty.

Following his capability framework, Sen (1990) marks a sharp difference between ends and means in order to differentiate between his theory of distribution and other non-Marxian theories of distribution. He points out that the criteria underlying the definition of 'development theory–practice' must be particular ends and not necessarily the means; for example, the commodity approach's good idea goes bad, insofar as mere means are transformed into ends. Instead of focusing on what goods (or resources) 'can do for people, or rather, what people can do with these goods and services', the commodity approach often collapses into a valuation of goods themselves as intrinsically good. For Sen, a concept of well-being that focuses on goods rather than on persons neglects the 'variable conversion' of goods into valuable human functionings and capabilities; that is, what the person succeeds in *doing* with the commodities. The justice connotation of distribution lies in the connection of the perceived virtues of distribution to the needs of society that, in Sen's approach, unlike most of the other discourses, cannot be simply rooted in income or commodities or goods. Sen critiques three particular types of equality—(i) utilitarian equality, (ii) total utility equality and (iii) Rawlsian equality to arrive at the "basic capability equality ... as extension of the Rawlsian approach in a non-fetishist direction" keeping intact the culture-dependent nature of Rawlsian equality. "The main departure is in focusing on a magnitude different from utility as well as the primary goods approach" (Sen, 1979).

> … the appropriate "space" is neither that of utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of primary goods (as demanded by Rawls), but that of the substantive freedoms – the capabilities – to choose a life one has reason to value. …

> The concept of "functionings" … reflects the various things a person may value doing or being. The valued functionings may vary from elementary ones, such as being adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to very complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the life of the community and having self-respect.

> A person's "capability" refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve. Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various lifestyles).

Of the three approaches—(a) the objectivism of the commodity approach, (b) the subjectivism of the utilitarian approach and (c) the Basic Needs Approach, Sen positions himself strongly against the

first two and builds on the third to offer a fourth approach that could perhaps be represented as (iv) the capabilities approach. The fourth (i.e. Sen's approach) definitely puts into question the first two approaches and extends the third in philosophically informed directions. For Sen, " 'Needs' is a more passive concept than 'capability,' and it is arguable that the perspective of positive freedom links naturally with capabilities (*what can the person do?*) rather than the fulfillment of their needs (*what can be done for the person*? [like what the World Bank can do for the third world woman/poor victim]" (Sen, 1984: 514). For Sen, the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) lacks adequate foundation: "what, among conflicting interpretations, should be meant by an appeal to needs. Is need satisfaction important because of the mental state of satisfaction? This would fall back into welfarism [or utility subjectivism]. Is meeting needs reducible to providing people with certain amounts of commodities? If so, the BNA becomes a new version of commodity fetishism" (Crocker, 1992: 603). Thus, for Sen, commodities, "even Rawlsian social primary goods, are necessary but insufficient either for positive freedom or for human flourishing. Utility at best captures part of the good life but at worst justifies severe deprivation and inequality. A basic human needs approach is concerned that development benefits human beings in ways that go beyond the subjective preferences and satisfy certain fundamental needs. This perspective, however, either falls back on commodities or utilities" (Crocker, 1992: 607). Sen offers the normative foundation of a new paradigm for development – the capability ethic; we have designated this as the 'first act of the humanization of development'. Sen's foundationalism, however, is not premised on some metaphysics of (human) nature; it is not an 'externalist' account of a transhistorical human essence; it is not 'scientific realism'; it is 'not a knock-down proof of something from some fixed area of external fact'; it is not a God's eye view of the way human beings are. It is "an 'internalist' foundationalism that aims to surmount the dichotomy of absolutism and relativism" (Crocker, 1992: 588), of objectivism and subjectivism. Nussbaum extends Sen's approach in two purportedly contradictory directions; on the one hand, a necessary component of Nussbaum's capability approach is the (purportedly objective) list of basic capabilities she offers. Taking off from a few Aristotelian questions, like "what activities characteristically performed by human beings are so central that they seem definitive of a life that is truly human?," ... "which changes or transitions are compatible with the continued existence of a being as a member of the human kind and which are not?" ... and "what kinds of activity must be there if we are going to acknowledge that a given life is human?", she offers a list of universal human capabilities so as to include issues such as being able to express "justified anger" and have "opportunities for sexual satisfaction". On the other, her objective list houses subjective states; it houses emotions; this she

does because Nussbaum thinks that 'emotions cannot be sidelined in accounts of ethical judgment'; emotions must 'form part of our system of ethical reasoning'; we must grapple with the material of 'grief and love, anger and fear' and see 'what role these tumultuous experiences play in our thinking about the good and the just'; for her, 'there can be no adequate ethical theory without an adequate theory of emotions' (Nussbaum, 2001).

Building on the 'first act of humanization' and on the distinction Sen marks between "what can the person *do*?" and "what can be *done* for the person?" we now move to the critique of the reduction of a part of humanity to the epithet *underdeveloped* and the consequent dehumanization. We ask: is the one deemed underdeveloped, *differently developed*; developed in non-capitalocentric, non-Orientalist paradigms? Is it a 'camel' and not an '*underdeveloped* horse'; its strength is in *sustainability* and not in spikes of productivity? This takes us to the second act of humanization.

II.   From *under*-developed to *differently* developed:

Our critique of (mainstream) development is premised on its not-so-secret capitalocentrism (Gibson-Graham, 1996) and Orientalism (Said, 1978). Capitalocentrism is unconscious; it is like an internalized gaze of capital; it is also a kind of unconscious identification with the logic of capital (even the Marxist is haunted by unconscious capitalocentrism). Capitalocentrism is to unconsciously look at the world and at reality in terms of the gaze, perspective and standpoint of capital. It is to divide the world into capital and *pre*-capital; where pre-capital is that which is *not-yet-capital* but would soon need to become one. It is to divide the world into developed and *under*-developed, first world and *third* world; where the underdeveloped third world poor is in need of 'relief' and 'aid'. The approach is centered on "what can be *done* for the [poor] person?" and not on "what can the person *do*?"; or on "what the (indigenous) person has been doing all along"; living like a camel perhaps; living *differently*; and not like an underdeveloped dwarf-horse. Orientalism reduces the same space and the same subject to a *pre*-modern relic; in need of modernization. The second act of humanization will perhaps require a learning to understand and engage with 'Other worlds' or the 'world of the Other' in terms other than the capitalocentric-Orientalist ones. Do we, however, have the tools or the training? Does University education render us deaf to the worldviews, philosophies and the concepts of the Other (Dhar, 2018)? We study the life-world of the Other; but we do not get transformed by the Other's worldviews, philosophies, concepts? How does one make sense of a

space and subject that is not underdeveloped but *differently* developed? How does one make sense of a space and subject that is not pre-capitalist but *non-capitalist*; that is not pre-modern but *non-modern*? How does one move from *lack* to *finitude* which underlies being, knowledge and desire?[3] This takes us to the third act of humanization.

III.   From Third World to World of the Third:

The third act of humanization is premised on a disaggregation of the 'hitherto underdeveloped' (and which has now been designated by us as *different*) into an *originary multiplicity of* those *class sets* that are 'hooked to the circuits of global capital' and those that are not and are *outside* of the circuits (designated *world of the third*). In this remapping of familiar worlds, world of the third is presenced as conceptually different and distinct from the given underdevelopment of the third world. World of the third is that which is *outside* the 'circuits of (global) capital'; whereas third world as produced out of an Orientalist understanding of the South is that which is the *lacking underside* of Western modern industrial capitalism (see Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2009).

   One is the *outside*; the other is the *lacking underside.*

   In the discourse of development, 'third world' is a substitute signifier for the 'Southern local'; and development is defined in terms of a certain *transition* of third world from a pre-capitalist and pre-modern state to a capitalist-modern state (see Chakrabarti and Cullenberg, 2003 for a critical take on 'transition'). Once one is conceptually incarcerated within infinite reiterations of third worldism, one loses sight of an outside; one loses sight of the world of the third. Enslaved cognitively within the category third world, one does not get to appreciate the possibility of an outside to the circuits of global capital, where the world of the third is such an outside. Instead, what awaits us as third world is a devalued space, a lacking underside that needs to be transgressed–transformed–mutilated in the name of development.

   World of the Third is thus the *inappropriate(d) Other*. Third world is the *appropriate(d) other*.

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[3] The Lacanian conceptualization of being and knowledge as haunted by *lack* and of desire as emanating from *lack* is re-written as *finitude* and *limits* to the metaphysics of being, imperialism of knowledge and cannibalism of desire in Dhar (2009).

The third act of humanization shall mean a turn to that which has been deemed *inappropriate* and has remained *inappropriated* in the discourse of development. How does one conceptualize capabilities-functionings in such a space? While capabilities-functionings do humanize development, do we need to rethink capabilities-functionings in terms of subject positions (possible post-capitalist and critical modern subject positions) within world of the third; do we need to rethink modernist and capitalocentric discourses of education and health?

This is also important because the brunt of the cruelty of capitalist development projects has been borne by the world of the third subjects. This paper is a critique of that inhumanity and an attention to the *pain* inflicted upon the world of the third in the name of 'development'. The humanization of development needs to be premised on a 'theory of emotions' (Nussbaum, 2001). In development studies literature such a process of violence is designated 'development-induced displacement'. Marx designated it "original accumulation" (not "primitive accumulation"). Such infliction of pain on the subaltern commons is *originary* for capitalist accumulation to take form; originary in the sense that each time a process of capitalist accumulation is put in place, there is at its birth, violent *originary accumulation*. The logic of capitalist development thus has its origin in originary accumulation. Capitalist development is constitutively constituted by the violence of expropriation and appropriation in world of the third contexts (see Chakrabarti and Dhar, 2009). How does one think well-being, quality of life and development as freedom in such contexts? Isn't development antithetical to well-being, quality of life and freedom in such contexts? The humanization of development – the turn to human development – would hence mean an end to this violence.

IV.   World of the Third *Subject*:

The fourth act of humanization would mean a turn to the *subject* in general and world of the third subject in particular. Building on Chakrabarti, Dhar and Cullenberg (2016) we would like to argue that the world of the third subject is about a 'third subject position' that is neither the 'first world' subject position nor the 'third world' subject position, but who exists alongside first and third world subject positions; who is both present and absent, present in terms of 'forms of life', but absent in discourse: the discourse of developmentalism in the Southern hemisphere, a discourse marked by both capitalocentrism and Orientalism. It is about a *third* world (not 'third world'), a world beyond

what are known as first worlds and third worlds. It is about a *third* perspective, a perspective beyond Capitalocentrism and Orientalism. It is about a *third* kind of experience, an experience that is neither capitalist nor pre-capitalist, but *non*-capitalist. It is about a *third* location, a location that is neither *within* the circuits of global capital nor at the *margins* of global capitalism in need of either benevolence (i.e. inclusive development) or annihilation (i.e. original accumulation), but *outside*, marking outsided-ness to global capitalism, in terms of its language-logic-experience-ethos. How does one work one's way through the experience-occluding concept 'third world' and reach this outside; this form of life and possibilities of living that thrive outside and beyond the circuits of global capital, that throw up principles different from capitalism's internal principles and its associated bio-political social life. The fourth act of humanization is to turn to those *subject positions* that constitute the world of the third. Would a turn to such post-capitalist and post-Orientalist subject positions further humanize development? This is of course not to suggest that all the world of the third subject positions is ethical. World of the third subject could be exploitative as also non-exploitative. Those world of the third subject positions that are non-exploitative could be the ground for postcapitalist subject formation (Gibson-Graham, 2006) and "a politics of emplacement"; not a politics of identity *per se*, but a "politics of the co-production of subjects and places. A politics of becoming in place" (Gibson-Graham, 2016: 288).

V.   Problems of (Development) Practice: Learning to learn from below

This paper is not just on the violence of capitalist development; which undeniably is the main problem. This paper is also on the violence of our own efforts at 'doing good' (in Development Practice) – which more often than not takes the form "what can be *done* for the person". Is the root of the violence also in the *form* of our own efforts at ushering in development – even if of forms other than capitalist development? For example, if in the human development approach one turns to questions of health and education, one would still need to engage with the question: *which* paradigm of health; *which* paradigm of education. Would the approach to health be premised on modern western medicine? Would it be through modern western institutions of education? Or would we need to rethink the paradigms of health and education in tune with the life worlds and worldviews of communities and subjects where human development efforts are being put in place as also philosophies of healing and philosophies of learning that are always already in place? For example,

what would be the perspective to education and pedagogy in indigenous contexts? Would we need to *indigenize* the process of education and pedagogy? Would we need to write textbooks in tune with the life world and worldview of the indigenous community in question? Perhaps one will also have to indigenize oneself, one's standard theories, and standard practices of doing good, doing politics and ushering in transformation.[4]

The fifth act of humanization is thus premised on a turn to the real human being; not data; not graphs; but breathing, living human beings; their experiences; and their know-how. It would also mean a *culturalization* of development. It would also mean a turn to the *know-how* in/of the 'world of the third'; the assumption: world of the third is the space where the "know-how" of what Lacan (2007) calls 'slave' and what we call the *adivasi* and the Dalit reside. "The recovery of the other selves of cultures and communities, selves not defined by the dominant global consciousness" is perhaps "the first task of social criticism and political activism and the first responsibility of intellectual stock-taking" (Nandy, 1989: 265). However, one would also have to look at the culture of violence *within* what is designated as the 'local'.[5]

The fifth act of humanization would also mean that the adivasi is not merely a 'context' for developmental interventions. The adivasi worldview harbors 'concepts' – concepts about 'nature', 'gender', 'relationships', 'well-being' that are valuable and that could displace extant and hegemonic conceptualizations of the same in the world of the development studies scholars and development practitioners (Wagner, 1981; Viveiros de Castro, 2015)?[6]

This is possible only when one has re-established the long lost real relationship with the 'subaltern'. Not to study them; not to churn out papers on their miseries; but to relate to them and their miseries; to alleviate some of the social suffering, if possible. It is about being in touch with the enigma of subaltern life and culture (Aind 2009) and generating one's own philosophical investigations not from philosophical scriptures but from the subaltern way of life or subaltern modes of being-in-the-world (Davidson 1995, Ganeri 2013). It is, as Spivak (2013) suggests, learning

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[4] The turn to *indigenization* has been designated elsewhere as *ab-originalization* (see Dhar 2015, 2020).

[5] See Chakrabarti, Dhar and Cullenberg (2016) for a form of thinking beyond *globalizing* and *localizing*, *universalizing* and *particularizing* impulses.

[6] Waitoa and Dombroski (2020) argue that concepts deployed by the community economies collective need not necessarily be translated into Māori. "Commons" as the nodal signifier of the 'ethical economic coordinates' is a term Māori and Indigenous scholars are suspicious of, "since the Left has often used this to celebrate commoning practices that are in fact occurring on stolen land that should be returned to the commons management of *iwi* 'tribes'."

to learn from below; through what Spivak calls a 'no holds barred self-suspending leap into the Other's sea', as in immersion?

VI.   Being in the Polis: Problems of (Development) Studies

> I am not your data …
> I am not your project or any exotic museum object,
> I am not the soul waiting to be harvested,
> nor am I the lab where your theories are tested,
> I am not your cannon fodder …
> or your entertainment at India Habitat Centre,
> I am not your field …
>   -   Abhay Flavian Xaxa[7]

The sixth act of humanization would be what Arendt in *The Promise of Politics* designates as the old and short-lived Socratic urge to be in the polis; to lead a life of philosophical enquiry tied to the polis and not far removed or detached from the polis (Arendt 2005). In that sense, "Socrates marks the beginning of practical philosophy: practical in being concerned with questions of what one ought to do as an occupant of some social role, or more generally with how one ought to live as a human being". Development Studies can perhaps be humanized only if it is singed in transformative social praxis; i.e. if poverty is alleviated; not just studied. Do our studies in development then need to come closer to the Socratic urge of being in the polis, or at least being close to the polis? Is being in or being closer to the polis and perhaps the life-world/worldview of the 'Other' an alternative to how we have hitherto conducted studies in development?

VII.   Philosophers have hitherto only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point is to *change* it:

The eight act of humanization would be in terms of what Marx designates in the first of the Eleven Thesis as "dirtying one's hands" (Marx 2016). It would in turn mean the displacement of 'field work' with *immersion in subaltern life-worlds and worldviews*, of research with *action research*, of theories of social

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[7] Xaxa, A. F. and Devy, G. N. 2021. *Being Adivasi: Existence, Entitlements, Exclusion.* Vintage. Gurugram: India.

suffering with *practices of social healing.* We at the Centre for Development Practice (www.cdp.res.in) argue for three departure points in our rewriting of fieldwork as immersion. One, for us, the 'field' is prior to the research question; in other words, the research question emanates from the 'field'. Listening, communicating and relating with the Other becomes crucial in the form of action research we have undertaken and developed. Two, the focus is not just on knowledge-production. The focus is also on transformation. Knowledge production (i.e. standard forms of research) is ground for the identification of the problematic on which one shall initiate the process of transformative social praxis. Three, 'community', through the catalytic action of the action researcher, takes hold of the process of self and social transformation; the community is not a passive recipient of development; it is a co-participant in action research.

The nascent *idea* of Development Practice, which at present has taken the form of an 'immersion' and 'action research'-based MPhil programme at Ambedkar University, Delhi, tries to "span the gap between the academy and activism, engaging in place-based action research involving both university and community-based researchers/activists" and inaugurate in the "beehive" of the University (Derrida, 2003) the foreclosed question of praxis and of the "slave's know-how". The idea of Development Practice – inspired by the reflection of Tagore's (2009: 137-160) *Sriniketan* in the rearview mirror and Gibson-Graham's (2016: 289) "a politics of becoming in place" in the windscreen view – is an attempt at also 'breaking the silo' and at *integrating* (development) studies and practice. Our action research projects have aimed to "recognize and value" the distinctive economic, political, cultural and nature-nurturing "capabilities of localities" or 'world of the third', and have tried to build upon the know-how and the ethics of practices within, through nourishing extant communal practices, as also constructing alternative economic, political and cultural institutions.

VIII. Knowing-Being-Doing:

Does this require a ninth act of humanization in terms of setting up the Borromean Knot of *knowing-being-doing*? It is however not easy to inhabit a Borromean Knot; all the more because both knowing/theory and doing/practice have their own idiosyncrasies. Theory has its own high handedness; one thinks one 'knows'; one thinks one can judge practice. Practice, on the other hand, has a kind of moral high ground; one is 'good because one is engaged in 'doing-s'. Practice at times

critiques theory for being 'arm-chair', distant, detached. Theory looks down upon practice for being 'interventionist' or 'activist'. How to work through the mutual mistrust?

While, as 'academics' we were setting up a deconstructive relationship with developmental theories, our relationship with practice was somewhat naïve; all the more because we, at CDP, had taken the turn to practice as sacrosanct. We were, as if, content in 'being in practice'. We had begun to see practice as the new alternative. Earlier, we would see the work of Sen or Escobar or Nandy as instituting alternatives to growth-centric development; thus alternative developmental theories were seen as alternatives; now an alternative to theory – 'practice' – was seen as the alternative. We were thus not managing to interrogate practice; or disaggregate kinds of practice; or distinguish between practice and practice; say for example, distinguish between Women in Development (WID), Women and Development (WAD) and Gender and Development (GAD) approaches when we were working with Self Help Group (SHG) women (Rathgeber 1989). Practice also looked to have an unbearable weight of its own. It seemed to have to it a self-perpetuating character. It was difficult to reflect on practice, while in practice; the Archimedean distance was difficult to institute. We were also not managing to connect specific developmental theories with specific forms of developmental action; and vice versa. What were the kinds of practices that would emanate from the capabilities approach? (Sen 1985). What kinds of practices would the postdevelopmental perspective engender? (Klein and Boada 2019). What would the 'critique of capitalocentrism and Orientalism' (Chakrabarti and Dhar 2009) in development give birth to in terms of practice? What is the nature of postcapitalist and post-Orientalist practice? Did we need to move from production and income-centric practices, from mere practices of 'empowerment' to a pluriverse of alternative practices? Could the experience of such a pluriverse of practices "in the polis", could the "dirtying of one's hands" engender alternative theories; or alternatives to the 'theory/practice' divide?

This is also to problematize the traditional and derivative opposition of theory and practice and begin to think anew what has come to be known as the 'theoretical' and the 'practical', where the practical, a la Heidegger (1985), is (a) rescued from the instrumental conception of action, (b) freed from the tyrannical imperative to produce effects, and (c) relieved of the manic race to exploit all resources, including human resource.

IX.   From Development to *Reconstruction*:

Tagore (1963) displaced the imagination of politics imprisoned in *theoria* (or mere contemplation, cognitivism, thinking, writing etc.) to real and actual transformative social praxis, including self-transformation. Shantiniketan and Sriniketan remain living testimonials of such transformative social praxis. He was thus moving us from the *politics of mere critique* (which in other words is the politics of 'dis-ease identification') to the *politics of reconstruction* (which in other words is the politics of 'social healing'); politics of reconstruction is for Tagore, in turn, a politics of setting up a *relationship* with the subaltern and working one's way towards *ethical being-in-commons* (Dhar and Chakrabarti, 2017, 2021). Tagore's insights regarding the political can be extended to development. Development can be rethought *as* reconstruction (of world of the third).

Few questions thus become important in this ninth act of humanization: (a) *doing*, not just knowing (development is not just *writing* about wrongs, but about *righting* wrongs [Spivak 2004: 523–81]), (b) doing with *who*: not the underdeveloped, but the different; not the appropriate(d), but the inappropriate(d) in subaltern subject positions; not the third worldist subject of *lack*, (c) doing *with* (world of the third) and not doing 'on' (hence immersion, hence co-researching, co-authoring transformation as in the action research programme at CDP) and (d) doing *what*: i.e. doing *differently*, doing re-constructively and not developmentally; for example, reconstructing the rural in terms of considerations of social justice and well-being (building on, say, extant non-capitalist class processes in the rural [see Chitranshi and Dhar, 2021]), and not transitioning the rural to the characteristics of the urban.

Further, while much of the above can be designated as processes of "righting", i.e. correcting socio-historical "wrongs", the ninth act of humanization is premised on the question: is the process of "righting wrongs" through development itself marked by unacknowledged wrongs, subtle albeit? Do we need further reflection on the process of righting wrongs?

X. Transformative Philosophy:

Does this require a tenth act of humanization: i.e. a turn to *transformative philosophy* – a philosophy of not just being intelligent but about being good as well – where philosophy is not just a way of knowing but a *dharma* – a way of life and ethical living as also a painstaking process of transforming, both self and social. Does one need to redefine Philosophy itself, where philosophy is not an academic discipline but a 'way of life/living' (Hadot 1999; Ganeri 2007, 2013), an 'art of living counter to all forms of fascism' (Foucault 2000), a form of *therapia*, where the practice of philosophy is a way of becoming; where philosophical activity was not a form of accumulating knowledge but an exercise in self-transformation, an *askesis* (Foucault 2005; Dhar and Chakrabarti, 2016). Where philosophy was to form subjects, and transform subjects, and not to just to inform the academia. Where philosophical practice was to transform oneself and the way one sees, to regard otherwise the same things. Where philosophy was the practice of a certain way of living, a certain way of being with oneself and with Others; and where philosophy is an exercise in self-transformation and world-transformation.[8]

XI.   What is it to cure ourselves of the Cure?

The eleventh thesis opens space for a reflection on 'development'; development in itself. It is premised on the question: do we need to *cure ourselves of the paradigmatic Cure*: development (Dhar, 2022)? While the sixth to the tenth theses is focused on a turn to practice, the eleventh is focused on a *critique of* (development) *practice*. Do we need to cure ourselves of paradigmatic practices in the development sector, or at least rethink them rigorously, so as to humanize development; practices of 'problem-solving' like income generation for the poor (marked by the philosophy of more), empowerment for women (marked by the philosophy of more power), civilizing mission for the adivasi (marked by the philosophy of elitization-modernization-westernization) put in place by both global and hegemonized local institutions. It is perhaps time to take a close look at the problems of problem solving; such a critical reflection on extant 'modes of problem solving' and hegemonic models of practice could perhaps humanize development further.

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[8] See Dhar (2018) for a turn from (modern) Philosophy to first, the forgotten tradition of *practical philosophy* and then *transformative philosophy* (www.practicalphilosophy.co.in).

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