

Picture of the Human in Psychoanalysis

Between Practical Philosophy and Medieval *Sahajiyā*

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Abstract: If Freud engendered the Copernican turn in the Cartesian picture of the person, Lacan offered the Keplerian turn. The paper *works through* the works of Freud-Lacan and Deleuze/Guattari to arrive at three meanings of the unconscious: (i) repressive, (ii) non-repressive and (iii) productive of surplus. It displaces the Cartesian ›I think, therefore I am‹ with the ›It thinks‹ – i. e. the unconscious thinks; therefore ›I think, where I am not‹ and ›I am, where I think not.‹ It shows how the person in psychoanalysis moves from self-reflection to self-transformation, i. e. from a close look at the ›mirror of being‹ to a ›canvas of a new becoming‹; where the mirror becomes a canvas for redrawing the ›graph of affect‹ and rewriting the palaeolithic script on the person's Mystic Writing Pad. Building on insights gleaned from a medieval spiritual ›cultivation of self‹: *Sahajiyā*, the paper sees psychoanalysis as also a larger *praxis of living-loving*, and not a mere means to medicalized individual cure.

Keywords: mirror of being, canvas of becoming, unfamiliar unconscious, limbic listening, cortico-centrism, sexuation, androgyny, Mystic Writing Pad

[An uncanny Other]¹

has the keys to my house.

So how can I unlock the door and see

with my own eyes

the treasures inside?

It's my house that's full of gold.

But the [uncanny Other] makes all the deals.

I was born blind and can't see

what's going on.

Perhaps the doorkeeper will agree

to let me in.

But tell me, how will I find this doorkeeper?

I travel the wrong road.

... *Lālan* says, That treasure is mine,

but I don't know it.

Somewhat paradoxically, I have begun this paper on the ›person in psychoanalysis‹ – which is a modern western praxis – with a Bāul² song by Lālan Sāi (1772–1890). Primarily because I see psychoanalysis as a new wine in an ancient bot-

tle; a bottle that houses non-modern (and non-western) forms and practices of what could be called *cultivation of the self*. It houses, the ancient Plotinian activity of a sculptor, chipping away at related blocks of the marble of self, or accretions in order to find, as also found a new self-becoming. The movement in such practices of the self is thus from a *mirror of being* to a *canvas of becoming*. In the analytic setting, the analyst serves as the mirror for the *analysand* (the person in analysis). The analysand sees her motivational, aggressive, nurturant, envious, and erotic architecture (also arche-texture) etc. in the analyst-as-mirror-of-self. The invitation to the analysand is to work through the extant architecture and engender self-transformative realignments. The urging is to ›use‹ the mirror of self/being as a *canvas of a new becoming*.

I see psychoanalysis as fundamentally a return to or a modern revival of older (i. e. non-

modern) as also non-western practices of the self. Lālan's song is representative of one such tradition of cultivation of the self (a tradition that could be represented as the *Sahajiya* tradition; more on this below). Lālan's song is also an invitation to picture the ›picture of the person‹ as haunted by a stranger, an inassimilable Other (akin to the Freudian unconscious or the Lacanian Real in psychoanalysis) who has the keys to my abode, my *hidden abode* (*verstecktes Heim*) of affective production (see Marx, 1990 [1867], p. 279 *Capital Vol. I*); hidden not only from others, but also from the self.

For Freud (1919), the uncanny or *das Unheimliche* is the class of frightening things that is concealed from the self, but that also leads us back to what is known and familiar. It thus puts to question the modern liberal belief that ›I‹ have the key to not just myself but to the treasures of the planet as well. How does one unlock the secrets of the inside? How does one reach both the treasures (and the debris of rage, aggression, fear, melancholy, trauma, loss) inside? We have our life-historical blind spots. We have not just travelled the wrong road at times. We have also repeated (*Wiederholungszwang*) the sojourn along wrong roads, in a kind of *motivated irrationality* (›akrasia‹ in Greek [Lear, 1999]). Freud shows in ›Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through‹ how though the analysand does not consciously *remember* the forgotten or the repressed, she nevertheless *acts* it out, without, of course, knowing that she is repeating under the spell of the forgotten or repressed. One hence requires radical self-doubt about the self, about personhood. One also needs to ask the Socratic question: ›Who am I? What sort of a person should I be? How should I live? How should I love? What kind of live should I lead? What values shall I live for? What is my *dharma*? What shall I aim for?‹ The person in psychoanalysis embarks on an old Socratic sojourn. Works through *dharma-sankats* (›existential dilemmas‹ taking the form of the question: *what should I do*, given the contradictions).

To build on the ›picture of the human‹, this paper has begun – as we have seen above, not with psychoanalysis – but with reflection on a medieval praxis of the person – called *Saha-*

jiya – one receives in the rear-view mirror, as one is driving.³ If through the windscreen view one sees ›modern psychoanalysis‹, through the rear-view mirror one sees traces of medieval *Sahajiya*. Traces of the musical Bauls and Fakirs in Bengal – spanning Buddhist, Sufi and Bhakti traditions – who birth the *Sahaj* way of life: a way of life premised on ›a state of equilibrium between the self and the world‹ and a ›recognition that the individual is the microcosm‹ (Dimock, 1989, p. 42). One can hence see modern psychoanalysis as a new wine in an old bottle; with its *uncanny* ›picture of the human‹. The old bottle of Buddhist Tantra (where maternal polytheism comes to take centre stage; Samuel, 2014) and *Sahajiya* houses questions and practices similar (and dissimilar) to those of psychoanalysis. There is hence partial continuity in the picture of the human both engender and nurture. The *fort-da* – or perhaps the Möbius – between the windscreen and the rear-view mirror shall create for us the ground for a picture of the *sexuated* human in psychoanalysis. Sexuated: because in psychoanalysis as also in medieval *Sahajiya* the human is not a neuter(ed) register. The human is constitutionally sexuated. Sexuated however does not refer to biological sex or socialized gender. ›Sexuation‹ refers to the *unconscious* (enunciations) of sexuality; it is the *chasm* between ontology and epistemology, between ›to be‹ and ›to know‹ (Zupancic, 2017, p. 140–143). Our respective sexuation could hence be at odds with our known biological sex and socialized gender; one may be born a male and may have got socialized as a masculine gender but could have a form of sexuation different from male-masculine; there could also be *crossovers*, because sexuation as contingent becoming is merely a subject-position (Dhar, 2009).

Building on Bose (1948, 1949, 1951, 1952a, 1952b, 1952c), Kakar (1982, 1989, 2007, 2011) and Nandy (2009 [1983]) one can argue that in Indian thought and in aesthetic representation, the two sexes are not seen as (binary) opposites, but as a Möbius⁴, where each is continuous with the other, and is imbued with possibilities of crossovers. In painting and sculpture, one sees the depiction of this crossing of genders in the

portrayal of lovers, say in the traditional Orissa or Bengal school, where they appear as one *androgynous* entity. The human-divine forms Radha and Krishna are frequently represented as dressed in each other's clothes. At times, the fair-skinned Radha (the woman) is seen as taking the more active masculine role; and the dark-skinned Krishna (the man) is seen as getting reborn as Radha. Sur Das – the blind medieval poet writes: »You become Radha you become Madhava, truly Madhava; this is the reversal which I shall produce. I shall braid your hair and will put (your) crown on my head. [...] Thus the Lord becomes Radha and Radha the son of Nanda.«⁵ Kakar (1989) shows how it was only under the influence of the 19th century western ›two sex model‹ (Lacquer 1990), one of the dubious intellectual ›blessings‹ of British colonial rule, that western-educated Indians have begun to see man and woman as *opposite sexes* and have become uneasy with crossovers, Möbius of genders or androgyny. In the Sahajiya tradition, and the Bhakti cults, where the worshipper must birth an erotic relationship with the earthly divine, the transcendence of boundaries of gender becomes an imperative for the male devotee, who endeavours to *become woman* in relation to the divine. The 15th century Gujrati rebel poet and medieval spiritualist Narsi Mehta writes: »I took the hand of that lover in loving converse [...] I forgot all else. Even my manhood left me. My body seemed to change«. The ›wish‹ to *become woman* may not stem from a lack of phallic strivings but could be a legacy from the infant's early experience with not just mothers, but the expanded ›maternal feminine continuum‹ (see Kakar, 1989; Kakar & Ross, 2011) that serves as the gendered cradle for the infant; as also from processes of becoming-woman through ›action-identity‹ and ›ego-identity‹ with the maternal-feminine continuum (Bose, 1999, p. 17; Dhar, 2017, p. 20–27). This ambisexuality (not bisexuality) where the infant and (m)Other are in a Möbius, where the play of masculine and feminine is interminable, probably represents the complex an-Oedipal subject position of the child before Oedipus, castration anxiety and guilt enter to limit and dull the polymorphous perversity of the sexual.

What however is Sahajiya?⁶ An originary multiplicity of *crypted* praxis and processes of (aesthetic-erotic-amorous) expression perhaps; with what Wittgenstein designates *family resemblance*. Sahajiya is about a ›way of life‹ that worships human beings – because it is in humans that ›the *ultimate* resides‹, rather than in deities, idols and images (*murti*); that does not observe distinctions of caste or religion; that is ›absorbed in the nectar of matter‹ and that affirms the value of material substance, or immanent materiality. There is a certain wandering, a nomadcity at the core of this way of life; ideally one shouldn't be sedentary; or *grihastha*; i. e. a mere householder, metaphorically. Psychoanalysis also invites us to not be sedentary or stabilized or fossilized with respect to the self; it urges us to unsettle ourselves with our uncanny and unknown truths and move to a canvas of self-transformative becoming (Foucault [2005] calls it *askesis* and distinguishes it from ›asceticism‹ [also see Ganeri, 2007, 2013]). Sahajiyas are not renunciate ascetics. Nor are they circumscribed by the dreary desert sand of reason. They value feelings, emotions and are attentive to the affective. They host the music of madness. They host love and longing. They host the deepest respect for *bhagaman* and not *bhagaban* (God); where *bhagaman* is representative of *bhaga* (literally ›vagina‹) and *man* (›respect‹ for embodied woman and the feminine). Psychoanalysis – especially the spiritualized form of psychoanalysis hosts affect, madness and the question of sexual difference (more on this below) in the uncanny itinerary of the person.

The Uncanny in the Person

»A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.«

Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations

Psychoanalysis ›works through‹⁷ (*durcharbeiten*) an *uncanny* picture of the ›human‹. The conscious, cognitivist and transparent picture of the

human is put to crisis by psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic picture of the human is a Möbius between conscious and unconscious processes, between cognition and affect, between transparent and obdurate elements in the psyche, between that which is ›revealed‹ and that which is ›crypted‹ (between the *Heimliche* and the *Unheimliche*),⁸ between surface scripts and depth structures, and between cortical and limbic processes in the constitution of the (neuronal) self. In that sense, the psychoanalytic picture *puts under erasure*⁹ the picture of the human put in place in western Enlightenment humanism. It also puts to critique the utility maximizing Homo Economicus. The human is not just adding digits to one's bank balance. One's affective balance sheet, one's affective audit shows loss from the beginning. Loss of the mother's breast at the moment of the uncoupling of the mouth-breast machine (in medicine, one calls it weaning). Further loss of the mother and of sole possession of maternal love to the father (in a heterosexual family), for example. Loss through the reconstitution of the infant's space of infinite freedom in her early years: one sleeps here, one eats here, one pees here. Loss through the reconstitution of the infant's temporal rhythm: one sleeps now, one gets up at, one studies at etc. One hence begins with ›-1‹ (or ›-x‹). One is not just adding ›+1‹ (or ›+y‹) to one's affective account. One is also adding loss, limits¹⁰, finitude¹¹; including otherness. Psychoanalysis – as *technique* – is an impossible summation (and acknowledgement) of loss in the analytic setting (*not* clinic) through a ›restitution of the past‹ (Lacan, 1991, p. 13).

$$\Sigma_{\text{loss}}$$

Including, the loss of freedom; contrary to liberal and American insistence on expansion of freedom. Weaning, toilet training, incest taboo institute radical cuts or constrictions in oral, anal, urinary and genital freedom. The infant's time-space curvature is sculpted. *When* to sleep, when to pee, when to shit. *Where* to sleep, where to pee, where to shit are all delineated. The original multiplicity of possibilities, the polymorphous possibilities are constricted to normalized and normativized ones.

For Deleuze and Guattari the psychoanalytic unconscious is that which is *not* normalized and normativized; which *resists* and is *outside* processes of normalization and normativization (more on this below). This is, of course, not the only way to think of the unconscious; one can see the unconscious as also a *rem(a)inder* of processes of normalization and normativization. For Freud and Lacan, the unconscious is the ›censored chapter‹ of processes of normalization and normativization. The traces of the censored chapter remain *written* elsewhere; say, in *monuments* like the *body* (which can be deciphered like an archaeological inscription), in *archival documents* like *childhood memories*, in *semantic evolution* (the person's particular vocabulary), in *personal traditions* (which, in a heroized form, convey the person's life-history), and lastly, in the traces of the censoring that are inevitably preserved in the distortions necessitated by the insertion of the adulterated chapter into the chapters surrounding it. The picture of the person is thus not a secure ontology. It is haunted by the censored chapter.

Freud also states ›the repressed does not constitute the whole of the unconscious. The unconscious is the more extensive; the repressed is one part of the unconscious‹. There have been efforts to designate the rest of the unconscious as the ›non-repressed unconscious‹. But perhaps, that is not enough. That is too homogenous. One needs to disaggregate the idea of a non-repressed unconscious. The non-repressed unconscious can be further disaggregated through Lacan in terms of *psychoanalytic subject effects* (effects other than ›repression‹ [*Verdrängung*]). What could be those subject effects: Disavowal (*Verleugnung*)? Forclusion (*Verwerfung*)? Could the much neglected concept of ›negation‹ (*Verneinung*; Freud, 1925) be the ground for another subject effect? Could the ›missing signifier‹ (*verworfen*) produce exceptional and appreciable subject effects? Should we settle with just a few subject effects? Or is there a *multiplicity* that defines the *theatre* of the unconscious? The person is a product of such subject effects.

For Deleuze and Guattari, this opens up an

other angle: is the unconscious a *theatre* or a *factory*? Is it frozen? Is it fluid? Is it marked by impersonification? Is it about masks? Is it about characters? About roles? About role models? Would we understand the unconscious through the metaphor of theatre? Or is the unconscious a »secret abode of production« *a la* Marx in *Capital*? Is it about laboring? About surplus? Do we need to Marxize the Freudian-Lacanian understanding of the unconscious? The picture of the person is contingent upon the understanding of the unconscious – as »repressed and censored by normalization« or as »escaping normalization and producing non-normalizing surplus«.

The Unconscious: Theatre or Factory?

The psychoanalytic unconscious is hence not just lodged at the repressed/censored core of each and every person; as a kind of deep interiority or private inner cave. It is at the cusp of the pre-normalized personal register and the hyper-normalized social. It is at the cusp of the psychological and the socio-economic, including media, art, and the general chaos of the world. Neither is the unconscious universal. It produces itself and is produced differently in particular circumstances and cultures. It is unfamiliar to a normalized worldview. It is also un-familial. Haraway (1997, p. 265) *ab-originalizes*¹² (i. e. »puts under erasure« the Freudian origins of psychoanalysis; she also puts to question the original Freudian formulas tied to the Daddy-Mommy-Me nuclear Oedipal triangle) the Freudian unconscious: it's time to theorize an »unfamiliar unconscious«, that is not based on the model of a white, heteronormative European family: a model supporting the individuation of a capitalocentric, phallocratic and often racist (re)production of subjectivity. This is to resist the reproduction of hyper-neuroticized social norms upheld in turn by the classical formulation of a familial Oedipal unconscious (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983; Guattari, 2011 [195]). The unconscious is not about social adaptation in accordance with prevail-

ing norms; *quite the opposite*. What matters then is not the existence of polarized Oedipalized entities within a »universal structure« but productive micropolitical processes of immanent contingent »becomings«, a »multitude of mutant becomings« (Guattari, 2011, p. 195). Guattari sees the unconscious through the *polyphonic logic of productive affects* (like surplus producing labouring activities in a factory *a la* Marx) rather than a *theatre of representations* and a logic of substitute signifiers (Guattari, 2011, p. 45). The picture of the person is accordingly curated in Freud-Lacan (through the allegory of Sophoclean theatre) and in Deleuze-Guattari (through the allegory of the Marxian factory). In the Freud-Lacan framework dreams are engendered because the censor is weak during sleep. In the Deleuze-Guattari framework dreams are the creation of the productive unconscious. Here the unconscious acts like a »night time filmmaker« producing images, sound and affect through uncanny processes of condensation and displacement, metaphoric cuts and metonymic slides. Thus if dreams are the private screening of a personal film, films are the public screening of social dreams.

It thinks, there-four we are




Fig. 1: The L-Schema
(Lacan, 2006)

Psychoanalysis puts under erasure the Cartesian picture of the person: *I think, therefore I am*. It puts to crisis both the »I« and the »therefore«. One moves from »I think« or »I focused thinking« or the belief that »I think« to *it thinking*. *It thinks*, therefore I am. *It* – the unconscious thinks (on my behalf), therefore I

am. It is the Copernican-Keplerian decentering of the ›I‹ and of ›thought‹.

»It thinks rather badly, but it thinks steadily. It is in these terms that Freud announces the unconscious to us: thoughts that, while their laws are not exactly the same as those of our everyday thoughts [...] are certainly articulated. [...] Freud called the locus of the unconscious *ein anderer Schauplatz*, another scene«

that »is found to subsist in an alterity with respect to the subject«, »the unconscious is the Other's discourse [*discourse de l'Autre*]« (Lacan, 2006, pp. 458f.).

The person thus emerges as a four-footed or four-fold register in psychoanalysis. With a conversation along an Imaginary axis: ›a‹ to ›a'‹; ego and alter-ego; and an axis of the unconscious: ›S‹ to ›A‹; more precisely, A to S; the unconscious treasure trove of signifiers to barred S; or that which gets the subject (S) barred/split. As if the person has two face(t)s: ›a‹ and ›S‹: where ›a‹ is in communication with ›a'‹ and ›S‹ (i.e. the ›it‹) is in communication with the internal/unconscious Other (›A‹). The axis of what 'a' wants to and means to say (the conscious communicative, at times, rational intention) and what gets heard (or how it is heard) are not in sync or in tune. They cross each other. Interrupt each other. They cut each other to put the Cartesian ›therefore‹ to crisis. Instead, there are at least *four* registers: a, a', S and A; and there is alienation and misrecognition at the heart of the set of relationships that the person is.

The animal that therefore I am

Freud deploys the term ›Bemächtigungstrieb‹ (Strachey translates it as ›instinct for mastery‹) to describe his grandson's *fort-da* with the spool in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (see White, 2010). ›Macht‹ (power), which is contained in the word ›Bemächtigung‹ perhaps shows how Freud integrated into his own theory Adler's theories on ›will to power‹ (which can be seen as the 8th ›drive‹ in addition to Panksepp's

seven; see below). Freud, however, deployed the German word *Instinkt* infrequently. He instead deployed the term *Trieb*. While *Instinkt* generally refers to an automatic, unlearned, stereotyped response to a specific stimulus and hence is close to the English *reflex*, *Trieb* connotes what could be designated as *drive*. The movement from instinct to drive, from physiological reflex to psychological vitality is crucial in the psychoanalytic understanding of the person.

Building on Panksepp (1998) I would like to foreground seven drives as constitutive of the human condition. Drives humans share with ›animals‹. The seven drives are:

1. *Seeking*: appetitive foraging and expectant interest
2. *Eros*: consummatory reward or orgasmic delight
3. *Fear*: trepidatious fear, freezing and flight
4. *Aggression*: destructive rage and aggressive attack
5. *Care*: nurturant care and loving affection
6. *Panic-Grief*: separation distress sorrowful grief
7. *Play*: rough-and-tumble play and exuberant joy

This complicates the picture of the person. The metaphysics of the ›human‹ and of humanism is put to crisis by the perspective of *shared drives*. Freud had (without the aid of functional MRI) anticipated the presence of two drives: the erotic drive (drive 2 above) and the aggressive drive (drive 4 above). The rem(a)inder of evolutionary ›animality‹ should not however be misconstrued as bestiality. ›The animal that the person therefore is‹ need not be received with shame. Care is as much a part of the drive rebus as aggression. The seven drives thus offer a picture of the 'human' that spans aggression (drive 4 above) and nurturant care (drive 5 above).

The Personal Iceberg

Psychoanalysis takes us to the 10/11th of the personal iceberg under water. It urges us to not restrict or delude ourselves to what we see




Fig. 2: The Iceberg-Model (Freud, 1940; Green, 2019)

above water (the 1/11th of the iceberg). It also attempts to engage with the »sub-individual zones of sense making« and affect, and the ethic of non-coercive reorganization of desire from below; through long durée *limbic listening*, i.e. listening to limbic processes, or the rhythm of the limbic (Rajmohan & Mohandas, 2007); in contrast to analytic philosophy, which takes the »mental theatre« of the subject as a given. We move from seeing to listening. Not conscious listening. But unconscious scanning. Not cortical listening. But *limbic listening*. Listening to madness. Listening to irrationality; even psychosis. Working one's way beyond normalization and normativization. Psychoanalysis is in that sense an *amoral praxis*. It is ethical. But amoral. The answer to the question »how should I live« is premised on the singularity of »who I am« psychoanalytically, including the uncanny structure of my unconscious. It is not premised on generalized or universal categorical imperatives.

Limbic Listening

Through the nineteenth century the cortex was seen as the organ of the mind and the subcortical brain was seen as mindless. The peripheral sensory-motor parts and the inner subcortical parts, including the parts that transmit impressions from the inside of the body, were considered to be purely reflex (we have seen in the section »The animal that therefore I am« how Freud had moved from reflex to drive). Thus, the philosophical distinction between mind and body had come to coincide with the anatomical distinction between the cortex and the subcortex. In this context, it is of utmost importance to work our way through the top-down *corticocentric* view of the Mind-Brain Möbius (including perhaps an over-privileging of grey matter) and the subsequent designation of certain areas as *subcortical*, as lower, as inferior. Contemporary advances in affective neuroscience argue for an *affective conscious-*

ness from below, from what has been incorrectly designated ›subcortical areas‹. Cortical functioning looks to be accompanied by consciousness only if it is ›enabled‹ by the reticular activating system of the upper brainstem. Solms and Panksepp (2012) show how damage to just two cubic millimetres of this ›lower brain‹ region obliterates consciousness. The consciousness generated by the brainstem also has *qualitative content* of its own. This could be designated *affect* – affect as in-between thought and action. Since cortical consciousness is contingent upon brainstem consciousness, affect is revealed to be the foundational form of consciousness. The sentient subject is literally constituted by affect. In this view, since »the cerebral cortex is the seat of intelligence, almost everybody thinks that it is also the seat of consciousness ... Consciousness is far more primitive than that. It arises from a part of the brain that humans share with fishes« (Solms & Panksepp, 2012, p. 163–166). This is the ›hidden spring‹ of affective consciousness (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Solms, 2021; Solms & Turnbull 2011). Perception itself is a nonconscious process, and begs the question: what does consciousness add to perception? The answer from Solms and Panksepp (2012): *consciousness adds feeling*.

Parvizi (2009) argues in a paper titled ›Corticocentric Myopia: Old Bias in New Cognitive Sciences‹ how the cerebral cortex is seen to have the most important role in ›higher‹ functions of the brain, such as cognition and behavioral regulation, whereas subcortical structures are considered to have subservient or no roles in these functions. Parvizi highlights the conceptual bias at the root of this corticocentric view of the human brain; he in the process emphasizes its negative implications in current practices in the cognitive neurosciences. The corticocentric view of the human brain is also a myopic view because it does not let us see that the purportedly higher functions depend on the integrity of the ›phylogenetically ancient subcortical structures‹, and by the affective processes associated with them. Psychoanalysis puts to crisis the corticocentric view of the person. Further, building on the *Encyclopaedia of the Human*

Brain (Ramachandran, 2002), one can argue that no single psychological concept fully describes the functions of any given brain area or circuit. There are no unambiguous ›centres‹ or loci for discrete emotions in the brain that do not massively interdigitate with other functions, even though certain key circuits are essential for certain emotions to be elaborated. Everything ultimately emerges from the interaction of many systems; from associations that are forged contingently. For this reason, contemporary neuroscientists talk about interacting ›circuits‹, ›networks‹, and ›cell assemblies‹ rather than ›centres‹ Steffen, Hedges and Matheson (2022, p. 7–9). This would entail a movement from the earlier ›centres‹ to *overdetermined assemblages of complex configurations*. This also takes us to a new understanding of the unconscious: *unconscious as structured like an uncanny assemblage of homeostatic processes* (and not just structured like a language, as in Lacan). The person has a familiar homeostasis (regulation of body temperature, for example). The person may also be haunted by an unfamiliar form of homeostasis (de-regulation of affect, for example, anger, anxiety, stuck-ness, melancholy etc.). In this sense, no one person is ›normal‹ in homeostasis. All persons have a streak of homeostatic de-regulation. Some manage the de-regulation. Some's re-regulation is within tolerable limits. Some suffer substantially because of the de-regulation. Such personal de-regulation is a product of a much larger social de-regulation.

The Normal and the Pathological

The distinction between reason and madness is put to question in psychoanalysis; also put to question is the equation ›reason = normal‹ and ›madness = pathological‹. Though medicalized psychoanalysis seems to lapse into the division normal/pathological, spiritualized psychoanalysis would *host* madness, even psychosis. Spiritualized psychoanalysis takes us beyond the ›normal-and-the-pathological‹ as the defining dyad of approaching the person. Such that normativities, deviations from them, and return

to them (the conversion of the ego-dystonic to the ego-syntonic) are not the limited number of options available to the person. Such that there is no ›normal/straight stick‹, against which ›pathological/bent/queer sticks‹ are measured. Psychopathology as a sub-discipline thus becomes subject to the deconstructive. For spiritualized psychoanalysis all sticks are under water; all sticks are ›bent‹ in myriad ways. All sticks are marked by conscious commitments and unconscious dispositions; all sticks remain menaced by the two layered-ness of the Mystic Writing Pad (see below). In the process, spiritualized psychoanalysis inaugurates in the sciences of the person an attention to and an understanding of *intersubjectivity* (as against the ›first-person‹ and ›third-person‹ approaches to a science of the person) through in turn ›an attention *to* language‹, language as not just representing reality, »but rather the subject« (Borch-Jacobson, 1992, p. 85). Language is constituted as not just setting up a relation between the *word* (word-presentation) and the *world* (thing-presentation) as Freud had suggested, but as setting up a relation between and among persons. Lacan inaugurates an attention to the »relation between (the treasure trove of) signifiers and the (barred/split) subject«, to the »essentially linguistic structure« that underlies personhood (Lacan, 2006, p. 449). He inaugurates at about the same time an attention to scripts that are apparently illegible (Lacan, 2006, p. 364; Mitchell, 2000, p. 6).

Time-Space Curvature

»The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have known since long.«

Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations

The person in psychoanalysis is torn between a windscreen view of oneself (one could call it a »future-oriented semiosis« [Valsiner, 2021] marked by the question – how should I live) and an appreciation of oneself and one's past in the rear view mirror. The person in psychoanalysis

is torn between what has been experienced and felt in the past – especially in infancy and early childhood and the future. This is the phase when the person is being moulded into a law abiding citizen. The person is soft clay in infancy and early childhood and the contour of the ›(m)Other's desire‹ sculpts it significantly. The way the early care givers – which could be a maternal-feminine continuum – handles, touches and interacts with the infant has a deep and lasting impression on the infant; all the more because it is soft clay and susceptible to the Other's mould. The multiple Others form, reform, even deform the person's ›time-space curvature‹ and the person comes to be uncannily located in a particular temporal rhythm and spatial cartograph; to the extent that the person, at times, looks to repeat and remain hostage to such a skewed rhythm and cartograph. The person's self-healing – as Wittgenstein suggests – is in *re-arranging* or remodelling *what one has (not) known since long* about one's rhythm or cartograph.

Body: The Un-skinned Half

Lacan foregrounds »The Story of Half a Chicken« in *Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis* (2007, p. 55). It is the story of that side of a chicken that has been un-skinned; such that the bones, muscles, and blood vessels are showing. While the other half is still with skin; and hence covered with feathers. Psychoanalytically, does the human person present a similar picture? Does the human person have a skinned side: the side covered with *language*, with *signifiers*? Does the human person have an un-skinned side? The side where the bones, muscles and blood vessels can be seen? Lacan calls it the side of the *body*, or the side of *jouissance*; or »the other side, the cut one, the one where the *truth* probably was« (2007, p. 56). The psychoanalytic picture of the person is thus a Möbius of a side of the skin of language and the side of the body. In *Seminar XVII*, Lacan takes us to *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*. He also takes us to the »other side« of the person: the un-skinned side.

Empathy and the Other

The human person's need to find an answer to the question »who am I and how should I live« is haunted by an impossibility to know oneself fully. Even the image of ourselves that we get to see in a mirror is *laterally inverted*. We hence need an Other (at times the Other's gaze and desire) to make sense of who we are. The picture of the human person psychoanalysis engenders hence has a conceptual Other (and multiple concrete-real others). In the analytic technique, the analyst is that Other. In the Sahajiya tradition, the ›woman-feminine‹ is the Other. One can see psychoanalysis as a long *two-person meditation* (as against the one-person meditation in religion); meditation between the subject of the unconscious and the (m)Other; meditation between the unconscious as the Other's discourse and the barred subject; meditation between language and body, signifier and jouissance.

This paper has seen psychoanalysis as modern wine in an ancient bottle. The bottle was perhaps born at the bottleneck the process of childbirth engendered in the human species; as the human had become biped; producing in turn a narrowing of the pelvic/birth canal; human childbirth hence required assistance from fellow humans, from an Other (*were the first ones to assist women*). Is early midwifery then the midwife of human evolution (and not the Hegelian master-slave dialectic). This dyadic relationship of attending to pain perhaps got rediscovered in the *modern* two-person meditation (à la Kakar): *psychoanalysis*. The one-person meditation in religion had thus got rewritten as a two-person meditation in Freud. Meditation on the mirror of the analysand's being and the canvas of her self-transformative becoming(s).

Language

Light travels faster than the speed of sound. Psychoanalysis, however, subordinates the faster of the two to the slower. Light is made to serve sound. The oculocentric worldview is back-

grounded. What is foregrounded is *listening* and *patience*. The person is approached through language, through an attention to the »essentially linguistic structure« that underlies *even* »hallucinatory texts« (Lacan, 2006, p. 449). In the Freudian-Lacanian paradigm, psychoanalysis is an attention to the *undisclosed* in the person's language, at language that has been *dimmed over*, that has been *occluded*, that remains *buried*, at *covered up* language, as also to the language of that which was hitherto *unspoken*, to *repudiation*, »repudiation of a fundamental signifier«. The unconscious is thus that »chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter« (see Lacan, 2006, p. 215).

The Mystic Writing Pad

With respect to the question of the person, in »*On the Subject Who is Finally in Question*«, Lacan inaugurates not just a subversion of personhood, or a fracturing of personhood (which in other words is a pluralizing of subject positions as against one given subject position), but an understanding of the person beyond the ›Reality-Rationality-Pleasure Principle‹, beyond what gets written in an apparent and transparent way on the surface sheet of the ›Mystic Writing Pad‹. It is an understanding premised on the complex web of legibility-illegibility residing in the wax slab underneath; it is premised on what gets written and overwritten on the wax slab, producing palimpsests, producing unfamiliar (manus)scripts (Dhar, 2006, 2008). Lacan's »Discourse at Rome« (1953) – the Magna Charta of the *linguistic turn* in psychoanalysis – foregrounds the centrality of »the function and field of speech and language« in his re-conceptualization of the picture of the person:

»For Freud's discovery was that of the field of effects, in man's nature, of his relations to the symbolic order and the fact that their meaning goes all the way back to the most radical instances of symbolization in being. To ignore the symbolic order is to condemn Freud's discov-

ery to forgetting and analytic experience to ruin« (Lacan, 2006, p. 227).

One can locate the embryo of the linguistic turn in Freud's deployment of the ›mystic writing pad‹ as metaphor of (a) the human psyche, (b) symbolization in and of being and (c) the person's relationship with the ›symbolic order‹. The mystic writing pad is a slab of dark brown resin or wax with a work edging; over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet; it itself consists of *two* layers which can be detached from each other except at their two ends. The upper layer is a transparent piece of celluloid; the lower layer is made of thin translucent waxed work. To make use of the mystic writing pad one writes upon the celluloid portion of the covering sheet which rests upon the waxed slab. No pencil or chalk is necessary, since the writing does not depend on material being deposited upon the receptive surface.¹³ A pointed stylus scratches the surface, the impressions constitute the ›writing‹. At the points which the stylus touches, it presses the lower surface of the waxed work on to the wax slab, and the grooves are visible as dark writing upon the otherwise smooth whitish grey surface of the celluloid. If one wishes to erase what one has written, all that is necessary is to raise the double covering sheet from the wax slab; the close contact between the waxwork and the wax slab at the places, which have been scratched (upon which the visibility of the writing depended) is thus brought to an end. The surface is now clear of writing and ready to receive fresh inscriptions. The mystic writing pad engenders a particular picture of the person. In this picture, persons receive perceptions but retain no permanent trace of them so that the psyche can act like a clean slate to every new perception; while the permanent traces of the excitations which have been received are preserved in ›mnemonic systems‹ lying behind the perceptual systems. The person is thus endowed with a ›double system contained in a single differentiated apparatus: a perceptually available innocence and an infinite resource of traces‹ and the doubled-up process of ›repetition and erasure, legibility and illegibility‹ (Derrida, 1978, p. 226).

The inscriptions *received* on the resin or wax *cannot be lost altogether*; and although such inscriptions would not qualify as legible writing in the ordinary sense of the term, they would still constitute a *script* – uncanny albeit. Whenever one is writing, one is writing on the *already written* script; one is *getting written* by the uncanny script.

Through the metaphor of the Mystic Writing Pad, Freud problematizes the Cartesian subject of secure consciousness (›I think, *therefore* I am‹) and arrives at a radically different philosophy and picture of the person. He moves from the Cartesian ›Cogito‹ to the Spinozist critique of free will and self-determination. However, this decentering of the person in psychoanalysis does not mean that the ›analyst‹ is the master of knowledge or is the subject supposed to know. While ›client‹ may be preferable to ›patient‹, which tends to pathologize or stigmatize the person in therapy, Lacan proposes a different term: *analysand*. The *-and* ending of *analysand* is a gerund form (like *-ing* at the end of a word in English), which implies that it is the person in analysis who does the work of *self-analysing* in the mirror of being (akin to self-work or cultivation of self), *not* the analyst. Thus, while the rewriting of the picture of the person through the metaphor of the mystic writing pad decentres the being of the analysand, the rewriting of the person in analysis as *analysand* (and not a docile patient in need of cure, as in medicine or medicalized psychoanalysis) bestows at least the limited agency of *working through* unconscious processes on the person in analysis.

Intermission: Picture of psychoanalysis?

Let us pause for a while and reflect on the relationship between the ›picture of the person‹ and the ›picture of psychoanalysis‹. This is important because the picture of the person is intimately tied to the picture of psychoanalysis (including the picture of language psychoanalysis is working with). I would first like to draw a sharp distinction between *medicalized psychoanalysis* (which works with a

strict binarism of ›normal/pathological‹ and a metaphysics of ›health/disease‹) and *Sahajiya Psychoanalysis* (*Sahajanalysis* as a crisper designation; for a western audience however let us call it *spiritualized psychoanalysis*). Spiritualized psychoanalysis is also political psychoanalysis. Or politized psychoanalysis is spiritualized psychoanalysis. Why? How are they connected? For a few reasons limited to the purpose of this paper: one, it hosts madness; two, it hosts woman; three, it resists binaries like Reason/madness, Man/woman, Brahmin/Dalit, Divine/human, Human/animal, Reason/affect, Thought/art, friend/enemy, analyst/analysand etc.; four, it works through extant religious and caste divides; five, it works through the question of ›sexual difference‹ to reach an ›impossible love‹; six, it presents itself as a *micro-politics of self-transformation* and a macro-politics of a much larger *way of life*.

Beyond Psychopathology

In spiritualized psychoanalysis, *individual psychopathology is a symptom of a larger and deep-seated social psychopathology*. The larger psychopathology that haunts the person may come from the person's own life-history (largely within family) or the economic-political-cultural history that affects the person. Hence, it is only a larger social cure that can prevent individual dis-ease. However, currently what we have at hand is an elaborate nosology of individualized mental disease. We also have individualized Cures and Cures for individuals. How can we cure ourselves of these (individualized) Cures? It is not enough to have a nosology of diseases. It is important to cure ourselves of the paradigmatic medicalized Cures of modernity. Find new forms of healing. Find new forms of diagnosis. Diagnosis of social dis-ease. See individual suffering as a symptom or a footprint of forms of social dis-ease. Take care of individual suffering – knowing all the while that the problem lies elsewhere – in larger and deep-seated social dis-ease. What then are we doing in the individual clinic? We see the individual clinic as, first, a kind of *setting* (and not a clin-

ic). Second, we see it as a *micro-transformative setting* (one can also call it micro-political). It is a setting where ancient *asketic* processes are unleashed (see Foucault, 2005).¹⁴ Where medieval *Sahaja Sadhana* is put in place. Such that the person (not the individual) heals; heals partially, albeit. One still has to transform the larger social for the subject to remain healed. So as to sustain the healing. *Sustainable Healing*. One still has to work towards *macro-transformation*. Micro-transformation of personal relationships. Macro-transformation of social processes – through Group Healing, Collective Healing, Community Healing (one can also call it macro-political). Through the transformation of groups, collectives and communities into *caring-sharing cooperatives*. From Cure to care. *Sahajaskesis* is a Möbius of an interminable work of *becoming* with (a) persons and with (b) contingent emergent groups. In a parallel manner. Like a rail track. We thus move from mere knowing to knowing-being-doing; to becoming. We move from Philosophy to *practical philosophy*. From practical philosophy to *transformative philosophy*. One thus tries to connect ›depression‹ and ›oppression‹ in one's therapeutic or healing work. One connects ›maladies of persons‹ with the ›declining soundness of society‹. Is the mind unsound? Or is it an unsound society? Is the toxicity of culture creating pathological cultures of the psyche? Here personal healing remains cocooned in social healing. Spiritualized psychoanalysis is thus a *praxis of micro-ethics in interminable becoming*.

Hosting Madness

»If you name me, you negate me. By giving me a name, a label, you negate all the other things I could possibly be.«

Soren Kierkegaard

Spiritualized psychoanalysis is not apprehensive of madness that is constitutive of the human condition. It tries to relate to madness, *listen* to the text of madness. To return to the metaphor of the iceberg, for spiritualized psychoanalysis

1/11th of the person is reason; 10/11th is under-water or deep-sea madness/irrationality. Spiritualized psychoanalysis thus sees reason and madness as an undifferentiated experience, an undivided experience, a mutually constitutive experience in the person. To relate to the person would be to relate to the madness inherent in us. In medicalized forms of psychology or psychoanalysis, we can't relate to madness because madness has been handed over to the scientific world of mental illness and the abstract universality of the classification (nosology) of mental illness – DSM or diagnostics to be precise. Western modernism no longer communicates with madness; it delegates madness to medicine, thereby authorising no relation other than that of physical and moral constraint, or the demand for conformity to the ideals of Reason. Madness was dismissed, excluded, and ostracized from the circle of philosophical dignity, ordered away from the bench as soon as summoned to it by Descartes, this last tribunal of the Cogito. The constitution of madness as mental illness, at the end of the eighteenth century, and the language of psychiatry, which is a monologue by reason *about* madness, is put to crisis by psychoanalysis. Medicalized psychoanalysis however has been complicit in the silencing of madness. It has drawn up a new DSM: Neurosis and Psychosis (and Perversion). Old Testament: Freud. New Testament: Lacan. Once again, we have lost touch with madness. How does one return to madness?

In *Madness and Civilization* (1988, pp. 277f.) and *The History of Sexuality* (1990 [1976], p. 5) Foucault foregrounds the *continuity* of psychoanalysis with the techniques of the *Christian confession of the flesh* – his main focus being on the effects of power produced by psychoanalysis and on the way in which psychoanalysis fits into the long history of the »will to know«. In *Hermeneutics of the Subject*, however, Foucault suggests that it was Lacan who had returned in psychoanalysis to the question of *askesis* and the »relations between the subject and truth« and had tried to pose

»what historically is the specifically spiritual question: that of the price the subject must pay

for saying the truth. By restoring the spiritual question, Lacan had reintroduced into psychoanalysis the *oldest* tradition, the *oldest* questioning, and the *oldest* disquiet of the *epimeleia heautou* (»care of the self«) (Foucault, 2005, p. 30; I have italicized »oldest« to hint once again at the fact that psychoanalysis – especially spiritualized psychoanalysis – is a new wine in an old container).

I build on Foucault to mark the distinction between a medicalized form of psychoanalysis and a spiritualized form. The picture of the person in the former is marked by a pathologizing impulse. The picture of the person in the latter is marked by the mirror of the person's relationship with inner truth and the canvas of reconstituting the relationship between such truth and the person.

Sexuation: Hosting Woman

»A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push.«

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*

[An uncanny Other]

has the keys to my house.

So how can I unlock the door and see
with my own eyes
the treasures inside?

It's my house that's full of gold.

But the stranger makes all the deals. I was
born blind and can't see
what's going on.

Perhaps the doorkeeper will agree
to let me in.

But tell me, how will I find this doorkeeper?
I travel the wrong road.

... *Lālan* says, That treasure is mine,
but I don't know it.

I have been deeply moved by Carol Salomon's (1948–2009; who we unfortunately lost to untimely death) translation of *Lālan Sāi's* songs, to which she had dedicated many years of

labour. »Given the difficulty of the vocabulary, the nonstandard orthography of the notebooks, and dialectal pronunciation of the singers, it is easy to misconstrue what Lālan is saying on the literal level, not to speak of the esoteric level« (Salomon, 2017, p.6). Salomon shows how even scholars who know the Lālan tradition will sometimes jump to the wrong conclusions (similar mistakes could be made in the psychoanalytic setting because of lack of attention to the *personal dictionary* – i. e. the uncanny signifier-signified relationship – of the analysand). The first line of the Lalan song quoted above would read like this in Bengali: »āmār gharer cābi *parer* hate«. »Parer« or »par« in Lālan is not the neuter Other; but the sexuated Other: *woman*. Lālan calls the female »par« perhaps because a wife is referred to by her husband's family as »parer meye«, »another's daughter« in the conservative Bengali tradition; women are made to move in traditional Bengal during marriage from their »parental home« to the »house of in-laws«; hence they are an Other (»par«) in the house of the in-laws (Openshaw 2002, pp. 161f.). The »parer« in the above song is not an uncanny Other; but a sexuated Other: *woman*.

Medieval Sahajiya not just hosted madness (the challenge to modern psychoanalysis is how it will host psychosis); it also hosted the Möbius of genders. The *anima* in the *animus*. The *animus* in the *anima* (see Bose, 1949). The hosting of madness and of the Möbius of gendering is fundamental to the project of social healing. Sahajiya praxis also hosted (impossible) love and worked through the impossibility at the heart of love.

Both the Tantric and Sahajiya praxis believe that the person is a microcosm, a miniature universe; both believe in unity as the guiding principle of this universe, that all duality, even that of the sexes, or of religion, or of caste is falsehood and delusion and that cosmic unity is regained, or represented, by the masculine and feminine in sexual union. Both believe in certain types of mental and physical exercises – akin to Foucault's *care of the self* (»askesis«) as the means by which the person can get closer to the truth of one's being and bring to dialogue

the human and the divine, the masculine and the feminine within oneself; both begin with the analysis of the nature of the person, and see as the end-goal the arrival at the »natural state«, the *sahaja* state, the state of ultimate and blissful unity. The truth of existence is in the human person, and through the human person it must be known. For although the world is real, its reality is hidden by an impenetrable veil or *maya*. People who wander about the world seeking knowledge are merely deluded. The truth is right at hand: »Do not look afar for what is hidden nearby.« One will otherwise »be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to [one] to pull rather than push.«

Sahajiya philosophy of the person foregrounds interconnectedness and interdependence. In Sahajiya philosophy the space between self and Other, masculine and feminine subject positions is porous. The final goal of life is not to block and clothe the pores of communication, of madness. As in neurosis. It is to open the pores further. Open it so much that one reaches the music of *love*. With woman-feminine. With the divine within (the *human divination*).

Sahajiya praxis had, as if, anticipated Lacan's »there is no such thing as a sexual relationship.« It had taken two forms in Sahajiya praxis. It had acknowledged the impossibility of a relationship (this is the thesis of the *unknown prior* in Sahajiya philosophy). The Sahajiya-s also read into this axiom an angle Lacan missed. That the relationship was impossible because the relationship was *not* sexuated (Dhar, 2009). Because the axis of *sexual difference* was missing in the relationship (hence there was *no* relationship). There was no relationship because woman-feminine was missing (see Irigaray, 1985a, b, 1999). The Sahajiya-s invented a form of praxis that would take us to a relationship with the woman-feminine. So as to *work* on the relationship. Painstakingly. So as to work through to a possible relationship. Love is that *work*. However impossible. Sahajiya praxis is thus hosted not just the woman-feminine but (impossible) love. It was to work through the impossibility at the heart of love.

While building on an *unknown* and an *impossibility* at the heart of sexuated personhood, the Sahajiyas thus worked their way to an impossible relationship: *love*. The perspective of healing in both Sahajiya and the psychoanalytic canvas of becoming is in *sexuating* the relationship through an inauguration of the *two* of sexual difference, and of the woman-feminine, and then working through such two-ness to an impossible love.

Wittgenstein argues in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* that »even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life [and love] have still not been touched at all« (1922, p. 89). Sahajiya praxis and the spiritualized psychoanalytic ›mirror of being‹ touch life in its immanent sexuated materiality. Both also touch the ›canvas of becoming‹ through love. I see psychoanalysis as a *way of life* (contrary to the received theory of psychoanalysis as a *cure*) in tune with medieval Sahajiya praxis as a way of life. The picture of the person is hence an interminable see-saw between life and love, between mirrors of life-love and the micro-political canvas of a way of living-loving.

Notes

- 1 I have made a minor change in the translation by Salomon (2016). Salomon had translated the first line as »A stranger«.
- 2 Bāuls (›medieval musicians of love‹ in the eastern Indian context) themselves etymologize the word in support of different meanings, for example, as *be* (without) + *hul* (restraint), i.e. as being without the restraints of theology or scriptural religion; i.e. as being against the current (*ujan*); or from *ba* + *hul*, where the triangular Bengali letter *ba* represents the feminine and *hul* the masculine, to signify the masculine and feminine in union, a reference to older »Buddhist Tāntrik‹ practices« (Openshaw in Salomon 2016, p. xxv). Building on Baul (practical) philosophy, this paper sees psychoanalysis not just as a ›philosophy of the unconscious‹, but also as a ›philosophy of sexuation‹ – sexuation as ›the [il]logical development of the *cause* of gender«. Lacan in *Seminar XI* (1998 [1973]) foregrounds four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis: ›unconscious, repetition, transference and drive«. This paper argues for a fifth fundamental concept: ›sexuation‹ (Dhar, 2018). The picture of the person in psychoanalysis is intimately tied to the question of sexuation: i.e. to the *unconscious of sexuality*. Not the sexuality we wear on our sleeves. But the sexuality that wears us (off). Not the algorithm of sexuality we are conscious of and know of. But the spectral algorithm that is a *known unknown*. That affects us; that drives us mad; we ›act out‹ under its spell. That *haunts* our known ontology of the (sexed) person.
- 3 The Buddhist *carya* songs date from the Pala period (eighth to the twelfth centuries) and are Sahajiya in doctrine (Dimock, 1989, p. 41).
- 4 The three-dimensional figure of the Möbius subverts standard Euclidean experiences of space and the notion of ›inside‹ and ›outside‹. It looks like there are two sides to the Möbius strip. But the Möbius has only one. At a particular point of time, at the level of the localized experience of time, there looks to be two sides and the two sides can, as if, be distinguished; but when the whole of the strip is traversed it becomes clear that they are in fact continuous. A shorter temporality offers two spatialities; a longer temporality offers one. Further, because the two sides are continuous it is possible to cross over from inside to outside, and from one side to the other. Yet, when one traverses the length of the Möbius strip, it is not possible to pinpoint at which precise point one has crossed over from the inside to the outside or vice versa.
- 5 Radha in the *Erotic Play of the Universe* by David C. Scott. <https://www.religion-online.org/article/radha-in-the-erotic-play-of-the-universe>
- 6 This paper resists the reduction of Sahajiya praxis to the modern »delusional veil« designated Religion. Contrary to popular belief, this paper does not see Sahajiya (as also Sufism and Bhakti) as a derivative – at times dissenting and at other times assimilated (say commodified and pop-culturalized apparitions) – of *only* Religion. This paper sees Sahajiya as, what Marx designated, the »sigh of the oppressed« against both social and religious orthodoxy. Here Salomon's scepticism is important: »it is scholars rather than fakirs [and Bauls] who attempt to Islamize [or Hinduize] the tradition« (2017, p. 11). I see medieval *Sahajiya* as instead a ›way of life‹ (akin to practical philosophy or transformative philosophy). Psychoanalysis as a sustained two-person meditation on a possible way of life (premised on questions ›who am I‹, ›how should I live‹) is also seen in the tradition of practical or transformative philosophy.
- 7 The German term *durcharbeiten* gestures towards an overdetermined working through; working through surface symptoms, including speech and language and deeper resistances, including crypted and ›known unknown‹ registers of language and affect.
- 8 The person in psychoanalysis is seen to be haunted by the double connotation of *heimlich*: (i) known, familiar, revealed and (ii) secret, unknown, crypted. *Unheimlich* hence refers to both (i) the unknown, unfamiliar, crypted and (ii) revealed, uncovered, uncrypted.
- 9 To »put under erasure« (Derrida, 1978) is to put to crisis; put to self-doubt; put to ambivalence that which hitherto was normalized and naturalized. It is not to erase altogether and write altogether anew; but to nib-

ble at the secure borders of the metaphysical. It is to look for the cracks in the walls of extant logic.

- 10 Psychoanalysis is an acknowledgement of the *limits of love and knowledge* (Lacan, 1998).
- 11 See Dhar (2009) for a re-writing of the metaphysics of *lack* in Lacanian psychoanalysis (not in Lacan though) as *finitude*.
- 12 See Dhar (2004, 2007, 2015, 2018) for »genealogies of aboriginalization« in psychoanalysis. The aboriginalizing impulse puts under erasure the »original« concepts, formulations, and paradigms in psychoanalysis. The aboriginalizing impulse rewrites those »aboriginal« concepts, formulations, paradigms further in terms of insights drawn from subaltern life worlds and worldviews in general, and indigenous, black, Dalit and woman-feminine life worlds and worldviews in particular.
- 13 Writing does not depend on material, ink or chalk, that is being actually deposited upon the receptive surface. Writing depends upon the *impression* the material makes upon the receptive surface.
- 14 Foucault was of the opinion that »in both Marxism and psychoanalysis, for completely different reasons but with relatively homologous effects, the problem of what is at stake in the subject's being (of what the subject's being must be for the subject to have access to truth) and, in return, the question of what aspects of the subject may be transformed by virtue of [her] access to the truth, well, these two questions, which are once again absolutely typical of [Greek] spirituality [and Greek *askesis*], are found again at the very heart of, or anyway, at the source and outcome of both these knowledges« (Foucault, 2005, p. 29; see Dhar, 2014).

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Das Menschenbild in der Psychoanalyse Zwischen praktischer Philosophie und mittelalterlicher Sahajīya

Zusammenfassung: Während Freud die kopernikanische Wende im Rahmen des kartesischen Bildes vom Menschen herbeiführte, bot Lacan die keplersche Wende. Der Beitrag unterzieht die Werke von Freud, Lacan und Deleuze/Guattari einer Durcharbeitung, um zu drei Bedeutungen des Unbewussten zu gelangen: (i) repressiv, (ii) nicht-repressiv und (iii) produktiv an Überschuss. Er ersetzt das kartesianische »Ich denke, also bin ich« durch das »Es (d.h. das Unbewusste) denkt«; daher »Ich denke, wo ich nicht bin« und »Ich bin, wo ich nicht denke«. Der Beitrag will zeigen, wie die Person in der Psychoanalyse von der Selbstreflexion zur Selbsttransformation übergeht, d.h. von einem genauen Blick in den »Spiegel

des Seins« zu einer »Leinwand eines neuen Werdens«; wo der Spiegel zu einer Leinwand wird, um die »Abbildung des Affekts« neu zu zeichnen und die paläolithische Schrift auf dem Wunderblock der Person neu zu schreiben. Aufbauend auf Erkenntnissen aus der *Sahajīya*, einer mittelalterlichen indischen und spirituell ausgerichteten »Kultivierung des Selbst«, sieht der Beitrag die Psychoanalyse als eine größere Praxis des *Lebens-Liebens* und nicht nur als ein Mittel zur individuellen Heilung.

Schlüsselwörter: Spiegel des Seins, Leinwand des Werdens, nichtfamiliäres Unbewusstes, limbisches Zuhören, Cortico-Zentrismus, Sexuation, Androgynie, Wunderblock

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